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Mobility in the Mangroves: Catch Rates, Daily Decisions, and Dynamics of
Artisanal Fishing in a Coastal Commons
Abstract
This paper integrates institutional theories of the commons with insights from geography
and human behavioral ecology to explore the spatial and temporal dynamics of artisanal
fishing in Ecuador’s coastal mangrove swamps. The focus is on the cockle fishery
commons characterized by a mixture of formal institutional arrangements and an
informal division of fishing space that partially influences fisher decisions about where
and when to fish. Individual decisions are further explained to a certain degree by the
patch choice model since fishers often move on to new grounds when their catch rates
fall below average. These optimizing strategies requiring rotation within a socially
produced fishing space may contribute to resource renewal, perceived reliable returns for
individuals, and a relative stability in fishing effort, potentially mitigating against
resource depletion in open-access areas not managed as a common property regime. This
study of the interaction between shellfish harvesters, cultural institutions, and the
environment contributes to a spatially explicit theory of the commons and points to the
crucial role of resource user mobility and cultural institutions for the ecological
sustainability of shellfish fisheries. A better understanding of feedback between
individual decision-making and the self-organization of a social-ecological system has
critical implications for policy design and fisheries management at similar scales.
Keywords: artisanal fisheries; decision making; common pool resource theory; optimal
foraging theory; fisheries management; Ecuador
Resumen
En este trabajo se integra las teorías institucionales de los bienes comunes con los puntos
de vista de la geografía y la ecología humana para explorar la dinámica espacial y
temporal de la pesca artesanal en los manglares de Ecuador. La atención se centra en la
pesquería de concha prieta caracterizada por arreglos institucionales formales y una
división informal de espacio de pesca que influye parcialmente las decisiones de los
mariscadores acerca de dónde y cuándo pescar. Las decisiones individuales se explican
más detalladamente en cierta medida por el modelo de elección parche ya que los
pescadores suelen trasladarse a nuevos terrenos cuando sus tasas de captura están por
debajo de la media. Las estrategias de optimizar requiriendo rotación dentro de un
espacio social pueden permitir la renovación del recurso, capturas fiables para los
pescadores, y una estabilidad relativa en el esfuerzo pesquero, lo que podría mitigar
contra el agotamiento de los recursos en las zonas de libre acceso no gestionados como
un régimen de propiedad común. Este estudio de la interacción entre los mariscadores y
su medio ambiente contribuye a una teoría de los bienes comunes espacialmente explícito
y señala el papel crucial de la movilidad de los usuarios y las instituciones culturales para
la sostenibilidad ecológica en la pesquería. Un mejor entendimiento sobre la interacción
entre las decisiones y la auto-organización de un sistema socio-ecológico tiene
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implicaciones importantes para el diseño de políticas y la gestión de pesquerías en escalas
similares.
Palabras claves: pesquerías artesanales; toma de decisiones; teoría de los bienes comunes;
manejo de recursos; Ecuador
Highlights:
 A spatially explicit theory of the commons considers resource user mobility.
 Spatial and temporal dynamics of fishing effort emerge from individual decisions.
 Cultural institutions and previous-day catch rates influence fishers’ decisions.
 Fishers alternate between formal and informal systems of governance.
 Formal and informal governance systems are complementary and adaptive.
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Mobility in the Mangroves: Catch Rates, Daily Decisions, and Dynamics of
Artisanal Fishing in a Coastal Commons
1. Introduction
As a classic example of common pool resources, fisheries face many management
challenges due to the difficulty of excluding individuals whose harvesting efforts are
costly for a larger population of resource users who compete for the same resource space
(Berkes, 2001; Berkes, 2005; Feeny, Berkes, McCay, & Acheson, 1990; Gordon, 1954).
For geographers, the tragedy of the commons emerges out of mismatched scales in the
interaction between the spatial domains of resources and resource users, in which selfinterested actions result in resource depletion (Campbell, 2007; Giordano, 2003).
Overcoming a mismatch between management and ecosystem scales requires a better
understanding of the spatial organization and complex interactions between human and
natural systems at finer scales (Johnson, Wilson, Cleaver, & Vadas, 2012; Wilson, 2006).
Over the last several decades, commons theory has advanced understanding about
the importance of property rights institutions, which are often held as an essential
mechanism for maintaining or improving resource systems (Agrawal, 2001; Basurto,
2005; Basurto et al., 2012; Bromley & Feeny, 1992; Hanna, Folke, & Mäler, 1996;
Hanna & Munasinghe, 1995; McCay & Acheson, 1987; Schlager & Ostrom, 1999).
Similarly, customary marine tenure institutions have also been exalted in the literature as
social systems that effectively manage resources through controlled access and regulated
use (Colding & Folke, 2001; Dyer & McGoodwin, 1994; Johannes, 1978, 2002)
notwithstanding some skepticism about the assumed conservation ethics embedded
within those institutions (Lu, 2001; Pollnac & Johnson, 2005; Ruttan, 1998; Thomas,
2001). Despite numerous theoretical advances about the crucial role of formal and
informal institutions in environmental governance, the commons literature has given less
explicit attention to how spatial-temporal dynamics of the commons are produced
socially, politically and materially by various forms of human agency (Moss, 2014) and
how system-level patterns can emerge out of the self-interested behaviors of individuals
as a “precursor of governance” (Wilson, Yan, & Wilson, 2007). These questions are
especially critical considering that research on the spatial dimensions of fishing behavior
is of burgeoning interest in the fisheries science and management literature (Abernethy,
Allison, Molloy, & Côté, 2007; Daw, 2008; Salas & Gaertner, 2004; Teh, Teh, &
Meitner, 2012).
This paper explores dynamic spatial and temporal patterns in the fishing effort on
a micro-scale, focusing on fisher decisions and the role of resource user mobility over
fishing space in Ecuador’s fishery for mangrove cockles (Anadara tuberculosa and A.
similis). Mangrove cockles are bivalve mollusks harvested from the roots of mangrove
trees during low tide periods by artisanal fishers throughout their range from Mexico to
Peru (MacKenzie, 2001). I integrate institutional common pool resource theory (CPR)
with optimal foraging theory (OFT) for its explicit attention to the human-environment
interface to explore how fishers navigate over patchy ecological conditions and under
different governance systems. OFT has traditionally been used in anthropology to study
how foragers make decisions about resources to best enhance their fitness in a Darwinian
sense (Kelly, 1995). However, some OFT models offer appropriate methodological tools
to explore how resource users respond to ecological dynamics (Chimello de Oliveira &
4
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Begossi, 2011; Sosis, 2002). As such, theories in human behavioral ecology have been
increasingly applied to address practical issues in conservation, development, and
resource management (Aswani, 1998; Aswani, 1998; Chimello de Oliveira & Begossi,
2011; Heinen, 1995, 1996; Heinen & Low, 1992; Tucker, 2007; Tucker & Rende Taylor,
2007) and are compatible with rational choice theories and classical economic
assumptions about human behavior in the fisheries literature (Acheson, 2011; Béné &
Tewfik, 2001; Hilborn, 2007).
Using catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) data collected over four months in Isla Costa
Rica, Ecuador, the scope of this paper is confined to three specific questions. First, how
do catch rates of a previous day influence a fisher’s decision about where to fish and
when to move on? Second, how does the cultural and institutional context shape broader
spatial patterns of mobility over fishing space? Finally, what are the management
implications of this fine-scale analysis of the spatial-temporal dimensions of fishing
effort? The activity of harvesting shells represents the human-environment interface
where artisanal fishers interact with their biophysical environment and their culturalinstitutional context.
This case study of cockle fishing in Isla Costa Rica offers a unique opportunity to
observe how changing social constructions of the commons influence dynamics of
artisanal fishing and how fishers’ alternate between two kinds of governance systems: 1)
open-access fishing grounds with an informal division of fishing space and 2) fishing
grounds formally managed as a common property regime. Ecuador’s cockle fishery has
experienced harvesting pressures in the last 10 years (Mora & Moreno, 2009; Mora,
Moreno, & Jurado, 2011), further exacerbated by habitat destruction due to decades of
mangrove deforestation associated with shrimp aquaculture (MacKenzie, 2001; OcampoThomason, 2006). Shifts from top-down to bottom-up approaches in coastal management
during the late 1990s signaled an unprecedented recognition of ancestral rights for coastal
inhabitants, resulting in new property arrangements called custodias. The custodias
represent agreements between Ecuador’s Ministry of Environment and local associations,
which aim to protect mangrove forests and provide a framework for community-based
management of mangrove-associated artisanal fisheries. To date, there are 51 custodias
distributed throughout the five coastal provinces (Mestanza, 2014). The arrangement is
similar to co-management institutions in other parts of Latin America (Gallardo
Fernandez & Friman, 2011; Gelcich, Edwards-Jones, Kaiser, & Castilla, 2006; Pinto da
Silva, 2004; Van Holt, 2012).
The local association in Isla Costa Rica was one of the first in the southern
province of El Oro to receive a custodia. Their management plan specifies closure
periods, rules of use and access to a particular set of specially managed cockle beds
within the custodia boundaries (Bravo & Altamirano, 2006) similar to Ostrom’s design
principles of a common property regime (Beitl, 2011; Ostrom, 1990). Other cockle beds
within the custodia are harvested daily, operating on a first-come, first served basis.
These open-access areas within the custodia and beyond its boundaries are informally
divided among individuals based on personal preferences, habitual use, and mutual
respect (Beitl, 2014). The following sections will explore the complementary nature of
these two systems at a local scale illustrating the ways in which common pool resource
theory and human behavioral ecology are well-positioned to contribute to a spatially
explicit theory of the commons with critical implications for fisheries management.
5
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2. Spatializing Commons Theory
2.1 Theoretical Framework
Common pool resource (CPR) theory has typically classified social-ecological
systems into a typology of property regimes including public, private, common property,
and open-access (Feeny et al., 1990; Ostrom, Burger, Field, Norgaard, & Policansky,
1999). Giordano’s (2003) spatially-explicit theory of the commons is based on a typology
of resource characteristics along the lines of fugitive, migratory, and open-access, which
reflects variations in geography to better understand the interaction between the spatial
domains of the resource base and its users. Moss (2014) points out that spatial concepts
like space, place, territory, and scale have been treated more as a fixed means of
categorization in the commons literature rather than an object of analysis in and of itself.
Moss further highlights the essentializing tendencies of the institutional literature on the
commons, which has narrowly conceived of space as a static biophysical realm, thereby
failing to appreciate the dynamic human-environment interactions, cultural-political
dimensions, various forms of agency, and alternative geographies that shape the
production, use, and regulation of the commons (Moss, 2014). Combining ethnographic
research on the fishery commons with human behavioral ecology has the potential to
address some of these deficiencies in commons theory since spatial and temporal patterns
in harvesting behavior represent a dynamic human-environment interface.
From a human behavioral ecology perspective, cockles are sessile and predictable
like other shellfish, making them susceptible to overexploitation (Thomas, 2007a). This is
especially true in open-access situations where the domains of multiple users overlap
because of poorly defined property rights (Giordano, 2003) and low communication
levels among resource users (Janssen & Ostrom, 2008). On the other hand, from the
perspective of CPR theory, it is because of the sedentary nature of shellfish that resource
users may find it easier to devise institutions and invest in a management strategy, as in
the case of Maine’s soft shell clam fishery (Hanna, 1998) and other benthic fisheries
(Basurto et al., 2012). The relatively stationary characteristics of lobsters may have also
contributed to the widely documented emergence of a governance system in Maine’s
lobster fishery characterized by an informal system of territoriality among “lobster
gangs,” and a more formal system of co-management (Acheson, 1988; Acheson, 2003;
Acheson & Gardner, 2004; Wilson et al., 2007). Wilson and colleagues have argued that
such forms of collective action have emerged out of the self-interested behavior of
competing fishers (Wilson et al., 2013; Wilson et al., 2007; Wilson, Acheson, & Johnson,
2013).
Different OFT models have allowed researchers to test predictions about what
kinds of strategies allow foragers to optimize their harvesting efficiency. For example,
the prey choice model predicts which species should be targeted for optimal caloric
profitability (Thomas, 2007a). The patch choice model tests whether resource users will
abandon patches when the returns fall below their expected return rates, or mean
profitability for all patches in the environment (Charnov, 1976; Chimello de Oliveira &
Begossi, 2011; Sosis, 2002). Sosis (2002) has adapted the patch-choice model to explore
daily variation in fishing effort among Ifaluk fishers for bluefin tuna. His results show
that fishers switch to alternative patches (fishing grounds) when catch rates drop below
the per capita mean of the average catch rate for all patches. He argues these daily
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variations in catch rates are one possible explanation for why fishers do not consistently
exploit the most profitable patches all of the time, a nuance which is often obscured by
the aggregated averages in other patch choice studies. Chimello de Oliveira and Begossi
(2011) used a similar approach to study patch choices among small-scale shrimp fishers
in Brazil and also found that fishers moved on when the return rate of the previous trip
dropped below average.
Patch-choice models allow for a spatially explicit analysis of the dynamic
movement of resource users over a patchy environment. This application of the patchchoice model adds to a large body of research that uses ecological concepts to gain better
understanding of human-environment interactions that promote (or work against)
conservation with implications for resource management like niche partitioning (Nunes,
Hartz, & Silvano, 2011) or territoriality (Acheson, 1987; Begossi, 1995; Begossi, 2001;
Begossi, 2006).
2.2 Hypotheses
Optimal foraging models contain several assumptions, but the two assumptions
most relevant to this research are: 1) that fishers have perfect information about the
“quality” of fishing grounds and 2) the availability of resources within those fishing
grounds will decline with accelerating gains, similar to the subtractability problem in the
commons literature. While fishers do not have perfect information about the
environment, it is relatively safe to assume that fishers in Isla Costa Rica have a
specialized understanding about their preferred fishing grounds, which developed out of
habitual use (Beitl, 2014). Based on these two assumptions, this study tests the following
hypotheses:
H1: Cockle collectors switch fishing grounds when their catch rate drops below the
average gross return rate for all the fishing grounds in the environment.
H2: Patterns of fisher mobility are further influenced by the cultural and institutional
context.
Given the limitations of optimal foraging models, I do not rely on the sole use of
the patch choice model to explain the observed patterns in fishing effort. I also draw upon
21 months of ethnographic research on Ecuador’s cockle fishery to aid my interpretation
of model results and substantiate the implications for management.
3. Material and Methods
3.1 Description of Study Area
The Archipelago Jambelí in Ecuador’s southern province of El Oro is a landscape
mosaic comprised of mangrove forests, shrimp farms, custodias, and urban areas. The
main study area for this research is the village of Isla Costa Rica, a rural parish with
around 300 inhabitants located about 8.6 km from Puerto Hualtaco and the city of
Huaquillas on the Peruvian border. The climate is dry and tropical with an average
temperature of 25.4°C. The annual precipitation is about 300mm with the highest
amounts of rainfall from December to May.
7
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Similar to the other rural fishing villages throughout the Archipelago Jambelí, the
residents of Isla Costa Rica rely primarily on mangrove-associated artisanal fisheries for
a living. Residents harvest mangrove resources for subsistence and commercial markets,
including mangrove cockles and crabs, shrimp, beach clams, and a variety of finfish
species. Some households grow subsistence crops in home gardens, predominantly
watermelon, aloe vera, lemongrass, and passion fruit. Women and girls engage primarily
in domestic tasks while men and boys fish and collect cockles. There is one primary
school and since the year 2010, additional teachers from urban centers spend four days of
the week on the island to offer secondary school-level education, meaning that migration
to urban areas has no longer been a requirement in the past few years for those residents
who wish to continue their education. Almost half of the island’s 70 households have one
or more individuals who collect cockles on a full time basis, defined as 2-4 hours per day,
5-6 days per week. The other half engage primarily in other fishing activities and parttime cockle collecting.
As described briefly in the introduction, the cockle fishery in Isla Costa Rica is
characterized as a mixed management system because of the custodia. The boundaries of
the custodia do not encompass all the fishing grounds utilized by cockle collectors in Isla
Costa Rica, and not all the fishing grounds within the custodia are managed as a common
property regime with special rules regulating use and access (see Figure 1). Smaller
circles represent fishing grounds that are harvested daily and generally function as openaccess (OA) in the sense that neither territorial defense nor the exclusion of outsiders is
enforced. Larger circles represent the areas managed as a common property resource
regime (CPR). The rules governing the CPR areas were designed and mutually agreed
upon by members of the association. The rules include 10 harvest days after 30-day
closure periods, restrictions on shell size permissible for market (45mm in length, in line
with central government regulations), and a rotating guard duty by each member to to
prevent entry by outsiders. The rules of access have changed over time as the association
experimented with different management strategies that best supported social, ecological,
and economic needs of the community. For example, areas that were once harvested after
3-6 month closure periods are now only closed for 30 days. But the obligations of
membership have remained consistent as each member of the association has been
required to serve guard duty. Those who fail to fulfill this obligation are sanctioned.
Zones represent a geographical clustering of fishing grounds based on physical
features such as waterways and cultural features like the names of areas designated by
members of the community (see Figure 1). For example, Zone 1 is locally referred to as
“San Gregorio.” Zone 2 is “aquí atrás.” Zone 3 is “Sector Corazones.” Locals refer to the
fishing grounds managed as common property as “las areas,” which lie somewhere
between the boundaries of Zones 1 and 2. The cultural features of these zones were
further elaborated in a previous study of the fishing effort in Isla Costa Rica, which
revealed an informal division of fishing space based on personal preferences, habitual
use, and mutual respect among individual cockle collectors from the community and
beyond (see Beitl, 2014, for a more in-depth ethnographic description of the fishery).
Grouping fishing grounds into these four zones was necessary in this study to further
discern patterns of mobility and explore how fishers navigate over fishing space under
formal and informal governance systems in Isla Costa Rica.
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Figure 1. Map of the study area Isla Costa Rica. The map illustrates: 1) the area in custodia; 2) “daily
sites,” or the locations of fishing grounds harvested daily; 3) fishing grounds harvested monthly and
managed as a common property regime (larger circles); and 4) the informal division of fishing space into
three zones. Map compiled by author. Data Sources: Asociación Isla Costa Rica (2010); PMRC-CLIRSEN
(2006); Bravo & Altamirano (2006).

3.2. Methods of Data Collection
This research is part of a larger ethnographic study of Ecuador’s cockle fishery
based on 21 months of multi-sited fieldwork from 2006 to 2010. The observational data
presented here was collected over a period of 115 continuous days from March 8 to June
30, 2010. There were 27 individuals who agreed to report their daily catch, the number of
hours fished, the name of fishing grounds, and their alternative activity if they did not go
cockle collecting (Asociación de Mariscadores Pescadores Artesanales y Afines "Costa
Rica", 2010). The sample of 27 included 20 members from the Asociación Costa Rica
and one member from the community’s other association. The remaining six participants
were their sons under the age of 18 and therefore not eligible for association membership.
This sample represents almost half of the community’s estimated 70 part-time and fulltime cockle collectors. One field assistant collected the information from those 27
participants on a daily basis. The field assistant also documented additional fishers to
calculate the total fishing effort for the day, as well as the number of outsiders and
general locations where they were observed.
9
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3.3 Methods of data analysis
CPUE in the cockle fishery is defined by Ecuador’s National Fisheries Research
Institute as the total number of shells per unit of effort where each individual fisher
represents one unit of effort, and total effort refers to the total number of cockle collectors
on a given day (Mora et al., 2011). CPUE is a common fishery-dependent statistic used in
fisheries science to estimate the stock of a given species (NOAA, n.d.). This is similar to
the concept of return rate in the behavioral ecology literature that usually divides the total
catch by the total time invested. A simple expression of this concept can be represented
by the following equation:
R = CPUE/ T where R is the return rate; CPUE is the total number of shells harvested by
an individual on a trip; and T is the number of hours that individual spent fishing.
This formula was used to calculate the return rate for each fishing trip observation
in the dataset (n=1,544) and a threshold average of 26.33 shells harvested per hour for all
the fishing grounds in Isla Costa Rica.1
To further prepare the data for analysis, each observation was coded as a CPR day
when the specially managed areas were open for harvest and an OA day when they were
closed. I used Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to compare differences between the two
governance systems (OA vs. CPR). Then to test the first hypothesis (whether fishers
move on or stay put when return rates of a previous fishing trip fall below the mean), a
set of variables were coded as dichotomous dummy variables. For example, if the return
rate for an individual dropped below the average return rate for all areas, the observation
was coded 1 for “yes” and 0 for “no.” The same coding technique was used to classify
whether the return rate was above or below the mean by fishing ground, by zone, and by
individual fisher, and whether the fisher switched fishing grounds or zones in response to
a drop in return rates below the average. I employed a cross-tabulation and chi-squared
analysis to calculate likelihood ratios and test the relationship between return rates and
the decision to move on. The Pearson’s chi-square is appropriate to test the likelihood
that two categorical variables occur together (with four possible outcomes). A Fisher’s
exact test was used to test for statistical significance. All statistical analyses were
conducted using SPSS Version 22. I further drew upon the ethnographic research on the
cockle fishery and Isla Costa Rica to interpret the results.
4. Results
Out of 3,103 observations over a period of 115 days, 1,544 fishing trips were
recorded for the 27 participants who reported information about their daily livelihood
activities from March 8 to June 30. No one fished on Good Friday (April 2) or during the
local holiday, Fiesta Patronal (June 12), or any of the 16 Sundays in this dataset. The
CPR areas were open for the 10-day group harvest on three occasions during the field
season: 1) March 12-23; 2) April 24-May 5; and 3) June 7-18. Fishing effort increased
during the second and third CPR harvest periods as many association members chose to
take advantage of the higher return rates associated with the CPR areas (Figures 2 and 3).
The average daily catch rates were highly variable and there appeared to be a slight
1

Observations with no data (i.e. 16 Sundays, 2 holidays, and several observations in which certain
individuals engaged in alternate activities) were dropped from the analyses.
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increase in effort and decline in catch rates during April and June compared to March, a
trend that is more pronounced during the CPR periods.

Figure 2. Fishing effort by people in Isla Costa Rica over time (March 8 – June 30) indicated by the sum of
fishing trips by the 27 participants in this research plus additional fishers from the community. Reference
lines group together the 10-day open and 30-day closed periods of the CPR areas.

Figure 3. Average daily CPUE in Isla Costa Rica (March 8-June 30, 2010) self-reported by 27 participants.
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There are significant differences in catch rates between areas that operate as open
access and those managed by the local association as a common property regime. As
indicated in Table 1, the average CPUE in the CPR areas is 10 shells higher than the OA
areas and the percentage of trips in which an individual’s catch dropped below the
average return rate is slightly lower (51% in CPR vs. 57% in OA areas). The same trend
holds true for when return rates fall below the average return rates by individual. In other
words, OA areas are associated with a higher likelihood that daily return rates drop below
the average return rates by each fisher and the threshold average of 26.33 shells per hour
for all fishing grounds in the community. The table also indicates that fishers move
around much more within zones than across zones. Moreover, such mobility of fishers is
higher in OA fishing grounds (73%) compared with CPR grounds (38%). Finally, fishers
engaged less in alternative livelihood activities on the days that the CPR areas were open
for harvest (24% of the observations compared with 49% of the observations on OA
days).
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics comparing differences between management regime types,
open-access (OA) and common property regime (CPR) (n=1,544).
OA

CPR

Fstatistic

p-value*

74

84

35.490

0.000*

Average number of hours spent fishing

2.95

3.02

12.055

0.001*

Number of shells per hour

25.5

27.8

20.643

0.000*

Returns < mean return for all fishing grounds (26.3) (%)

57

51

5.157

0.025*

Returns < mean return by fishing ground (%)

55

58

1.266

0.261

Returns < mean return by zone (%)

55

58

1.620

0.203

Returns < mean return by fisher (%)

65

54

17.329

0.000*

Switch fishing ground (%)

73

38

217.184

0.000*

Switch zone (%)

44

12

197.890

0.000*

Likelihood of engaging in an alternate activity (%)

49

24

162.427

0.000*

Variable
Catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE)

Whether return rates drop below means

Whether fishers decide to move on or stay put

Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the dynamic movement of fishers over time by
summarizing the frequency by which they stay put or move on to a new fishing ground
under the conditions that their return rate of the previous fishing trip dropped below the
threshold average of 26.33 shells harvested per hour. Figure 4 suggests that alternating
among fishing grounds is quite common, regardless of return rates of a previous day.
However, the likelihood of moving on to a new fishing ground increases with statistical
significance when return rates of a previous fishing trip dropped below the average.
Figure 5 indicates that alternating among zones is much less common than alternating
among sites within a zone. On the other hand, the same pattern holds true that the
likelihood of zone-switching also increases when return rates of a previous day drop
below the mean.
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Figure 4. Frequency that fishers moved on to a new fishing ground after return rates fell below the average
during the previous fishing trip. X2=8.784; p-value=0.002; n=1,516.

Figure 5. Frequency that fishers moved on to a new zone after return rates fell below the average during the
previous fishing trip. X2=35.054; p-value=0.000; n=1,510.

14

Mobility in the Mangroves

Beitl

5. Discussion
5.1 Catch rates, decision-making, and fisher mobility
Individual decision-making among cockle collectors in Isla Costa Rica is partially
explained by optimal foraging theory’s patch choice model (Chimello de Oliveira &
Begossi, 2011; Sosis, 2002; Thomas, 2007b). Even though alternating fishing grounds in
Isla Costa Rica is common regardless of the return rates of a previous fishing trip, the
likelihood of moving on appears to increase as a response to diminishing returns. From
the perspective of human behavioral ecology, this finding suggests that fishers employ
optimal strategies to seek the most productive fishing grounds and then move on when
those areas are no longer profitable. These patterns of alternation among fishing grounds
in response to previous-day catch rates are also similar to the individual search strategy
described by Wilson and colleagues (2007) as one of the initial stages of fisher behavior
prior to the formation of groups in their computational model simulating the emergence
of governance in the Maine lobster fishery.
On the other hand, fishers may not always be cognizant of when catch rates fall
below an expected return rate. Changes at small temporal and spatial scales may be too
marginal for cockle collectors to consciously perceive in ways that inform their daily
decisions. As such, cockle fishers do not always switch fishing grounds when catch rates
fall below the average and sometimes switch fishing grounds regardless of the catch rate
on a previous day. This phenomenon is most likely accounted for by several other
cultural factors not systematically studied here, such as risk avoidance or travel costs,
which may be prioritized over any desire to maximize catch rates. Many studies have
documented non-ecological factors influencing spatial and temporal dimensions of
fishing behavior, such as perceptions about safety and fuel costs (Daw, 2008; Teh et al.,
2012; Van Oostenbrugge, Densen, & Machiels, 2001), access controls (Basurto, 2005;
Basurto et al., 2012), engagement in some level of occupational pluralism (Daw et al.,
2012; Griffith & Valdés Pizzini, 2002; McCay, 1978), or other non-economic factors like
personal obligations or illness (Guest, 2003). Moreover, individuals are differentiated by
unique harvesting strategies. For example, some fishers alternate frequently within and
across zones while others have clear preferences and habitually harvest particular zones
even if they are less productive (Beitl, 2014). A spatially-explicit theory of the commons
considers such spatial and temporal dimensions in the dynamic social production of
fishing space, which is discussed in more detail in the following section.
5.2 Dynamic cultural production of the commons and patterns of mobility
Some geographers emphasize the importance of understanding the ways in which
the commons are socially constructed to embody certain human values (McDermott,
2014; Shaw, 2014). These value systems, in turn, serve as an informal institution
encompassing unspoken rules, norms, or a moral code. The mangrove-fishery commons
in Ecuador has been characterized by an ethos of open access similar to what Moritz and
others (2013) have described about West African pastoral systems. Cockle fishers in
Ecuador generally believe that all fishers should have the right to harvest fish from
mangroves as long as they do not destroy them. In other words, no one should be
excluded from coastal wetlands except for shrimp farmers who have bulldozed the
mangroves away for the construction of their shrimp ponds over the last several decades.
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Despite the first-come, first-served nature of access in the cockle fishery, fishers
in Isla Costa Rica habitually harvest their preferred fishing grounds but do not actively
defend them (Beitl, 2014). This de facto system of preferences allows fishers the freedom
of movement based on their individualized knowledge, expertise, and judgment, as
opposed to the more structured collective choice agreements about the rules of rotation
and harvest that define the CPR managed areas. The informal system operates based on a
combination of aggregated self-interested preferences (Wilson et al., 2007) within a
culture of mutual respect and avoidance (McGoodwin, 1994; Moritz et al., 2013; Nunes
et al., 2011). While the informal division of fishing space can influence humanenvironment dynamics, it can best be described as a loosely governed commons
characterized by flexibility and high levels of mobility among fishing grounds, especially
in comparison to the explicit rule structure governing access to the CPR areas.
Assuming that fishers generally conform to the system of preferences that shape
the informal division of fishing space in open-access areas, the strategy of alternating
among fishing grounds permits cockle bed recovery after an exploitation event
potentially mitigating against depletion. Fishers are able to draw upon their ecological
and biological knowledge about cockles to allow fishing grounds sufficient time to rest
before the next harvest period. This local ecological understanding has informed the
harvest schedule for the set of fishing grounds in Isla Costa Rica managed as a CPR.
These areas serve as a reserve area for cockle spawning and growth during its closure
periods. Because of the strict set of rules governing harvest periods, the fishing grounds
managed as common property are associated with larger shell sizes and higher catch rates
(see also Beitl, 2011). Thus, from a behavioral ecology perspective, fishers accept the
short-term costs of vacating the more profitable sites (CPR areas) for less productive
fishing grounds (OA areas) to allow for resource renewal (Ruttan, 1998; Sosis, 2002;
Thomas, 2007b). This acceptance of short term costs has allowed conditions that permit
local investment and collective action in the areas managed as a CPR. Regardless of
whether cockle collectors are cognizant of when daily catch rates fall below an expected
return rate, the mobility of individuals under formal and informal institutional
arrangements may be a critical factor sustaining common pool resources in Isla Costa
Rica.
In the last several decades, this spirit of open access has been threatened by
multiple challenges such as increasing competition, displacement by shrimp farming, and
pollution. In many ways, custodias have helped coastal people reclaim their ancestral
fishing spaces after their livelihoods were undermined by export-oriented growth and
development of shrimp aquaculture. The custodias have granted new forms of agency
that have restructured the interactions between artisanal fishers and their resource space
through community-based resource management. They embody the ways in which
ideologies of universal access have shifted to an acceptance of several group
proprietorships. The changing valuation of public goods and ancestral rights has led to
the emergence of a new rule structure embodied by the common property regime, which
operates alongside the informal system of individual preferences. Both systems of
governance are highly complementary and allow for a certain “economics of flexibility”
(McCay, 1978; McCay, 2002). The CPR areas within custodias promote social,
ecological, and economic benefits for fishers who have access privileges. They provide
an ecological reserve for shellfish management and further provide incentives for
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individuals with access rights to invest in conservation. In turn, the fishing grounds
outside the formally managed CPR permit an economic safety net for fishers throughout
the country when alternative livelihood options are limited due to seasonal patterns in
other fisheries or the country’s larger economic conditions. The mixed property
arrangements combining CPR and OA suggest interesting possibilities for the
management of shellfish fisheries at similar scales.
5.3 Epiphenomenal resource management and the issue of scale
In the fisheries literature, optimizing strategies have been associated with
overexploitation (Gordon, 1954) and a tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968). Some
researchers have likened the moving on pattern to “roving banditry” or a fishing down
trend that eventually leads to extirpation (Berkes et al., 2006), especially when
management solutions are not aligned with ecological realities at appropriate scales
(Johnson et al., 2012; Wilson, 2006). On the other hand, optimizing strategies requiring
rotation among multiple fishing grounds in Isla Costa Rica may permit a form of
unintended resource management or self-organization at the system level, which ensures
relatively reliable returns for individuals and potentially mitigates against a tragedy in
open-access areas not managed as common property. Open access systems that operate in
a similar fashion, in which resource users can enjoy the freedom of movement, do not
always result in a tragedy of the commons even on larger spatial and temporal scales, as
documented in West African pastoral systems (Moritz, Hamilton, Chen, & Scholte, 2014;
Moritz, Scholte, Hamilton, & Kari, 2013). While Figure 3 indicates catch rates are higher
during March compared to April and June, the scope of this study does not capture
seasonality in fishing effort or fishery productivity, which has not been systematically
studied in Ecuador’s cockle fishery. Both biologists and fishers in Ecuador believe that
cockles spawn in January and February, possibly resulting in higher catch rates around
that time.
Epiphenomenal resource management is often possible in small scale societies or
low population densities even if conservation is not intentional (Begossi, 1995, 2006; Lu,
2001; Smith & Wishnie, 2000). However, as many geographers have pointed out, the
problem of the commons largely depends on the spatial, temporal, and technological
scale at which it is assessed (Campbell, 2007; Giordano, 2003). At this micro-scale of
cockle fishing in Isla Costa Rica, fishing space is shared among few users with a level of
fishing effort that is appropriate for the current market demands and available resource
space. As such, the resource domain is spatially small enough for a fisher to apply his
local ecological knowledge about cockle biology while also drawing upon the cultural
knowledge he has about the behavior of other fishers who share the same fishing space.
In this way, one’s “attachment to place” is not compromised, which lays a solid
foundation and cultural conditions for collective action or some other form of informal
resource management (Berkes et al., 2006). Many cockle fishers in Ecuador enjoy the
freedom of open access and perceive relatively reliable return rates, especially in
comparison with other mangrove fisheries associated with higher levels of investment in
fishing gear and uncertainty. For some Ecuadorians, cockle collecting is a primary
livelihood profession which they practice on a year-round, day-to-day basis. Others fall
back on cockle fishing as a safety net when economic times are difficult or in congruence
with seasonal patterns in other fisheries.
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On the other hand, the open access nature of the cockle fishery in Ecuador may
allow cumulative effects of declining catch rates due to uncontrolled fishing effort on
larger spatial and temporal scales. Many cockle fishers are concerned that the fishing
effort increased during the late 1990s at the end of the shrimp boom that attracted so
many migrants to the coast during the 1980s. A disease in cultured shrimp forced the
abandonment of many shrimp farms leaving many skilled and unskilled laborers in
coastal communities no choice but to enter one of Ecuador’s open-access artisanal
fisheries. The cockle fishery was the most accessible because of the negligible amounts
of investment required (rubber boots and gloves are optional). Thus while the
technological scale of this fishery is of minimal impact at the local level, the commons
problem is more pronounced on a larger temporal scale. Even though there is a general
perception of reliable return rates on a day-to-day basis, many fishers increasingly find it
challenging to let their preferred fishing grounds rest two to four weeks after a harvest
according to their local ecological knowledge and understanding about resource renewal.
Many fishers are also concerned about new competition and the loss of fishing space due
to mangrove destruction by shrimp farms or enclosure by other custodias, pointing to the
ways in which the problem of the commons is also shaped by alternative cultural,
political, and economic geographies (Beitl, 2012; Martinez-Alier, 2001; Moss, 2014).
6. Conclusions
Decades of research on the commons and customary marine tenure institutions
have generated much debate about whether humans are self-interested actors maximizing
their exploitation of resources as predicted by optimal foraging theories, or whether
conservation outcomes can emerge within the context of certain institutional
arrangements and property regimes. This case study has illustrated that optimizing
strategies requiring rotation among fishing grounds may be one factor contributing to
epiphenomenal resource management. Resource user mobility in response to previousday catch rates and the rules of cultural institutions may be key factors mitigating against
a tragedy of the commons in open-access areas not managed as a common property
regime. However, the cohesion of such a flexible social structure may break down on
larger spatial and temporal scales as “scaling up” the management of the commons has
long been considered a challenge (Arias Schreiber & Halliday, 2013; Berkes, 2005;
Ostrom et al., 1999).
On the other hand, the commons are socially constructed to embody human
values and this case of the cockle fishery in Ecuador illustrates the highly dynamic nature
of space, place, and territory in the commons. Custodias represent a fundamental shift in
values that once embraced an ethos of open access. Now the tenet of proprietorship
embodies a new way of valuing mangrove forests and ancestral community rights, with
implications for empowerment among disenfranchised fishers. In turn, these political
processes have influenced the nature of human-environment interactions in the cockle
fishery by transforming the individual choices of a free-for-all into the collective choice
agreements of the CPR. While the emergent social structures that define rules of use are
qualitatively different, these two governance systems are complementary in the case of
Isla Costa Rica, and neither system should replace the other. The fishers’ alternation
between formal and informal systems of governance has allowed for adaptive feedback
between social, economic, and ecological systems. This direct attention to social18

Mobility in the Mangroves

Beitl

ecological feedback may provide interesting insights for the management of other fishery
commons at similar scales. However more systematic research is needed on how
individual and collective choice decisions affect the dynamics of fishing effort allocation
at broader spatial and temporal scales.
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